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I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1990s was marked by signiflcant changes
in trading regimes around the world. New regional trading blocs,
such as the European Community and the North American Free
Trade area, emerged; traditional trade barriers, primarily tariffs,
were substantially reduced or are headed toward elimination;
many quotas and voluntary export restraints have expired; and,
the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations concluded in
1993 with new rules and a new World Trade Organization.
These developments suggested an inexorable movement toward
freer and more open trade. But, as the more recognizable trade
barriers disappeared, administered trade became proportionately
more important. "The reductions in tariffs have led governments
to resort to other practices which constrain trade, and the
restriction most often applied is antidumping law" (Anderson
et al., 1995, p. 321).
An examination of the workings of U.S. antidumping laws,
and the effects they have for the industries that use them,
can help to explain what is at stake in the policy debates
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over their continued use. This paper explores the use of U.S.
antidumping statutes by the domestic integrated steel industry.
Steel is selected because it is the largest user of U.S. antidumping
laws. The massive set of trade cases brought by the steel industry
in 1992 offers an opportunity to explore the strategies, eflects,
and beneflts associated with antidumping laws.
If antidumping cases are effective, as the steel industry must
believe, changes in the level and pattern of imports should be
discernible. An analysis of import data will determine if imports
declined in products where antidumping duties were assessed.
Further analysis will explore whether imports shifted to products
not covered by antidumping decisions. Finally, import data is
examined to determine if there was an apparent effect on imports
from the mere flling of cases, regardless of the ultimate outcome.
The implications for U.S. trade policy and for policy choices
in trade law enforcement are examined by looking at the initial
determinations of dumping margins by the Department of Com-
merce and the flnal decisions of the International Trade Commis-
sion. Questions of discretion in trade law enforcement are also
considered.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have found it difflcult to understand why some
trade policies are chosen over others. A political economy ap-
proach attempts to combine economic analysis with political
explanations for trade policy decisions. "Many economists have
turned their attention to attempting to understand the 'political
economy' of protection, by which is meant the actual determi-
nants of which industries receive protection, and of the structure
of protection across industries" (Kruger, 1996, p. 2).
Kruger (1996) examined the key political economy ques-
tions—why do governments choose trade policies that are eco-
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nomically inefflcient? Why are lower cost alternatives not cho-
sen? In a collection of essays, these questions are applied to re-
cent examples in speciflc industries, including semiconductors,
steel, automobiles, textiles, lumber, and agriculture. These es-
says test hypotheses about the effects on trade policy of such
factors as political strength, industry cohesiveness, past protec-
tion, and national economic interest. The flrst three are found
to be predictors of industry effectiveness in seeking protection.
National economic interest is the language of the trade policy
debate.
Rodrick (1996) presented a survey of political economy
models, asking why trade policies are universally biased against
trade? Four models are described: the tariff formulation function
approach, the political support function approach, the median
voter approach, and the campaign contributions approach. The
flrst is criticized for a lack of consideration for the preferences of
politicians, the second as lacking concern for the actions taken
by influential groups, the third as lacking realism, and the fourth
for ignoring other contributing factors. Rodrick concluded that
higher levels of protection exist when the following conditions
are present: labor-intensive, low-wage, low-skill industries; high
and increasing import penetration; and a regionally concentrated
industry. This is clearly descriptive of the steel industry in the
1990s.
A similar approach, applied speciflcally to the steel industry
by Lanway, Morck, and Yeung (Lenway et al., 1996) argued that
protection is sought because it results in greater private returns
for steel shareholders, higher wages for steelworkers, and bigger
pay increases for steel CEOs.
Still, Rodrick admitted there is "a serious gap in our under-
standing of what makes trade policy so inefflcient when consid-
erably more direct means of redistributing income exist" (1996,
p. 471). This question was addressed by Moore (Kruger, 1996,
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pp. 73-132), explaining both the economic conditions and the
political strengths of the steel industry; attributing steel's pol-
icy successes to a "steel triangle" of steel mills, the steelworkers
union, and powerful lawmakers representing steel-making con-
stituencies. As the industry has restructured, Moore observes a
weakening of its political strength and suggests more limited pol-
icy effectiveness will result.
Staiger et al. (1994) studied the non-duty effects on imports
of antidumping cases in the 1980s, flnding that the investigation
phase of antidumping petitions and any subsequent suspension
agreement reduced imports. On the other hand, withdrawal of
cases had no effect on imports. From this, it is concluded there
are two types of fliers of antidumping petitions:
(1) "outcome" fliers who intend for the entire antidumping
process to be followed and ultimately for duties to be
assessed; and
(2) "process" fliers who seek trade inhibiting effects from
initiation of antidumping investigations.
Reitzes (1993) found that the threat of antidumping enforcement
may alter strategic behavior under imperfect competition. Firm
behavior may be altered by the mere threat of antidumping en-
forcement (1993). Administration of the trade laws is addressed
in Anderson (1993) and Moore (1992) by exploring the question
of discretion on the part of ITC commissioners. Mixed evidence is
found about whether policy preferences and political considera-
tions combine with statutory authority in framing ITC decisions.
III. DUMPING AND THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS
What is meant by "dumping" and how do the U.S. antidump-
ing laws work? The flrst antidumping law in the United States
was adopted in 1916. Today's antidumping laws derive from the
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1921 Antidumping Act. That law provided for imposition of a
special duty when the secretary of the treasury "determined that
a U.S. industry was being or was likely to be injured or prevented
from being established by imports of a product at a price below
its fair value in the exporting country or in other export mar-
kets" (Finger, 1993). Since 1921, antidumping law has grown in
its technicality and its intricacies are beyond the scope of this
paper. Simpler explanation sufflce, however, to understand the
policy questions involved and to facilitate an examination of the
effects of antidumping policies.
Essentially, dumping is the introduction of imported goods
into the United States at prices less than some "fair" standard.
There are two types of dumping. Price to price dumping occurs
when the foreign market price is less than the home market
price. This type of dumping tactic may be used to achieve full or
efflcient plant utilization while maintaining high price levels in
the home market. Below cost dumping occurs when the sales price
in the foreign market is less than the cost of production. This
form of dumping relies on home market structural characteristics
such as government subsidies, the ability to cross-subsidize losses
with proflts from other business units, or access to unusually
large flnancial resources.
As initially established in the 1921 law, a successful antidump-
ing action must prove two elements. First, it must demonstrate
that dumping has occurred. Second, it must prove that injury or
the threat of injury has resulted from that dumping. The U.S.
antidumping statutes are administered and enforced by the De-
partment of Commerce and the International Trade Commission
(ITC). These two agencies have complementary, but very differ-
ent functions that lead them, as will be shown below, to very
different conclusions about dumping practices.
Upon the initiation of an antidumping case by a petitioner
(the Government can self-initiate, as well, but this is extremely
rare), the Department of Commerce undertakes an investigation
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to determine whether dumping has occurred. If its investigation
shows that dumping has occurred on certain products, commerce
calculates the dumping margins, that is, the amount of under-
pricing, and assesses provisional dumping duties on imports for
which bonds must be posted pending the flnal ruling of the ITC.
The ITC has the responsibility to determine the second half
of the antidumping equation—injury. The Commissioners must
determine whether injury, or the threat of injury, has occurred
as a result of the dumping. If an injury determination is made,
permanent antidumping duty orders are issued, subject to a
WTO-mandated flve-year sunset review.
Why is antidumping an attractive trade policy choice? Fin-
ger offers the most concise representation of the major criticisms
of antidumping: "it is not public policy, it is private policy. It is a
harnessing of state power to serve a private interest: a means by
which one competitor can use the power of the state to gain an
edge over another competitor" (Finger, 1993). Cunningham, on
the other hand, says this view ignores a fundamental underpin-
ning of U.S. trade law and policy; "Certain practices are viewed
as being unfair, and thus justifying measures to offset the unfair-
ness, simply because they are wrong . . . inherently distortive of
the competitive position of the foreign exporter" (Cunningham,
1998, p. 5).
Regardless of this debate, antidumping has become an attrac-
tive policy choice for at least four reasons. First, antidumping is
not necessarily seen as being "protectionist." Instead, antidump-
ing is supported on the "fairness" argument. Second, antidump-
ing involves a process that is at least quasi-judicial and akin to
the concepts of regulated fair competition in the domestic econ-
omy. Third, antidumping recognizes that different countries have
different policies regarding international competition. For some
policy makers therefore, antidumping statutes are the quid pro
quo for freer trade. Fourth, antidumping laws can be used as
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leverage in international negotiations. Antidumping laws "can
work to promote open markets, expand trade and put an end to
mercantilism and protectionism" (Mastel, 1966).
Who uses antidumping laws? Antidumping cases are brought
by a wide variety of industries. "While cases involving steel
products, semiconductors, and automobiles get the headlines,
the typical petitioners are manufacturers of such products as
canned clams or birch three-ply doorskins" (Cunningham, 1998,
p. 7). In the European Community, a compilation of antidumping
cases in the 1980s shows 93 cases brought by industrial chemical
companies, 41 steel cases, 31 in synthetic flbers, and 10 in
consumer electronics (Hindley and Messerlin, 1996). "Extensive
use is being made of such provisions. (B)etween 1980 and 1988,
thirteen trading countries initiated a total of 1665 antidumping
investigations" (Tharakan, 1991, p. 1).
IV. STEEL PROTECTION
The worldwide history of steel is characterized by a high
degree of politicization and a particular vulnerability to contro-
versial trading practices. "The intrusion of the state into this
sector has produced a trading environment characterized by car-
tels, highly restrictive import regimes, subsidies and dumping"
(Howell et al., 1988, p. i). In the United States, the last three
decades have seen the decline and restructuring of the domestic
steel industry. The decline was largely blamed on unfair foreign
competition.
The integrated steel industry and its allies have argued
that unfair foreign competition is the principal source of
the industry's economic decline. This argument has been
bolstered by the widely acknowledged presence of perva-
sive foreign government steel subsidies. These subsidies.
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combined with a structural slowdown in world steel de-
mand, have contributed to worldwide overcapacity. For-
eign flrms, the steel industry has argued consistently,
have dealt with this overcapacity by 'dumping' excess
production into the United States (Moore, 1996, p. 449).
There is debate over this proposition, of course. Some observers
place the blame for the decline of American steel on its failure to
modernize and its insulation from competition, not on trade.
"The sources of change and competitive shifts in the world
steel industry have in fact many roots; trade is not the sole,
or even the primary, reason for the crisis" (Jones, 1996, p. 157).
For this study, however, it is only important that the domestic
integrated steel industry believes that its problems are rooted in
unfair foreign competition, that "steelmakers, in fact, are locked
in a protracted competitive struggle, one that will ultimately
determine just where steel is to be made" (Hogan, 1994, p. 1).
Thus, steel has sought protection.
The period from 1969 to 1990 was an era of industry-speciflc
protection for the American steel industry. From 1969 to 1974,
voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) were negotiated with
European and Japanese exporters. In 1977, a trigger price mech-
anism was instituted for all steel products. This involved "a 'ref-
erence price' system that would serve as a basis for monitor-
ing imports to determine if there was prima facie evidence of
dumping" (Crandall. 1981, p. 43). Negotiation of successively
broader rounds of steel VRAs began in 1982. Two rounds of
VRAs predominated. The flrst, from 1984 to 1989, set the mar-
ket share for participating nations at 18.4 percent. The second,
from 1989 to 1992, comprised President Bush's "Steel Liberaliza-
tion Program"—a two and one-half year VRA extension; grad-
ual increase in market share to 20.9 percent; and negotiation
of a Multilateral Steel Agreement (MSA) to eliminate "trade
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distorting" practices in steel (Moore, 1996). The TPM and the
VRAs were rooted in antidumping actions. "Voluntary export
agreements are the outcome of negotiations that originate as an-
tidumping actions or other forms of administered protection"
(Rosendorff, 1996, p. 544). The steel TPM scheme "arose with a
rash of antidumping suits and culminated in the announcement
of the introduction of the trigger price mechanism" (Jones, 1986,
p. 83).
In April 1992, the VRAs were terminated, even though the
MSA negotiations had broken down over the question of allow-
able subsidies. Without speciflc protection, the steel industry had
only the generic trade laws to use to counter dumped or subsi-
dized steel. Curtis H. Barnette, chairman and CEO of Bethlehem
Steel, thus referred to the 1990s as the "era of trade law reme-
dies" (Brook, 1998). He argued that when the VRAs expired,
the Bush Administration "explicitly stated that the U.S. steel
industry should thereafter rely on existing unfair trade remedies"
(Barnette, 1994, p. 4). In June 1992, the steel industry flled the
largest set of antidumping cases in history.
V. THE 1992 STEEL TRADE CASES
On June 30, 1992, 12 U.S. steel producers and the steelwork-
ers union flled 48 antidumping cases against 21 foreign countries.
There were also 36 countervailing duty cases flled against subsi-
dized foreign steel. Together this was a record 94 cases brought
by a single industry seeking trade law remedies.^
The cases were brought in four categories of carbon steel
products: hot rolled flat products, cold rolled flat products.
^This article concentrates on antidumping, but the way in which these cases
were adjudicated does not always allow a clear separation of the data between
antidumping cases and CVD cases. When both are included in the statistical data,
it will be noted.
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corrosion-resistant flat products, and cut-to-length plate. Hot
rolled steel is the flrst level flnished product of a steel mill.
It is sold in coils and used as is, or subjected to further
processing. Cold rolled products represent the next level of
processing, a flrst stage of adding value to a hot rolled product
by, for instance, altering its width or thickness to customer
speciflcations. Corrosion-resistant steel is a higher value-added
product, having been coated or chemically treated for rust
resistant applications such as automotive hoods and doors or
home appliances. Cut-to-length plate is steel plate sized to
customer speciflcations, another value-added product.
The combined antidumping and countervailing duty (CVD)
cases involved 6.5 million tons of 1991 imports in these categories
of products, with a landed value of about $3.0 billion. Total U.S.
apparent consumption of these products in 1991 was 45.5 mil-
lion tons.^ The countries involved were Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, South Korean, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.
The petitioning companies alleged antidumping margins rang-
ing from a high of 177 percent for hot rolled products from Poland
to a low of 1.52 percent for plate from Belgium. In August, 1992
the ITC ruled on a preliminary basis that there was a reason-
able indication of injury to U.S. steelmakers from imports and
it allowed 72 of the 84 AD and CVD cases against 20 of the 21
original countries (all but Taiwan) to proceed to further investi-
gation. Nineteen (all except New Zealand) involved allegations of
dumping. In June, 1993, the Commerce Department completed
its investigation and announced its flnal antidumping margins.
These flndings are shown in Table I.
^Source: American Iron and Steel Institute.
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Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. August 1993. Publication 2664.
Two months later, the ITC issued its flnal determination
of injury and entered antidumping and CVD duties for certain
countries and products that were determined to be engaging in
injurious dumping. These determinations are shown in Table II.
As can be seen, the ITC flnal decisions resulted in a mixed
verdict for the steel industry. Generally, the ITC voted afflrma-
tively for the industry in cases involving most of the plate and
corrosion resistant cases, a few of the cold rolled cases and in
none of the hot rolled cases, notwithstanding the determination
of substantial dumping margins in these cases by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. Final antidumping duties were ordered for
the products with afflrmative ITC votes.
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Source: Author. Based on data provided by the U.S. International Trade Commission.
What effects did the cases have on imports for these cate-
gories of steel products? Expectations would be that imports of
steel products covered by antidumping duties would fall upon
flling of the cases and then either fall or rise depending upon the
flnal outcome of the ITC deliberations.
The data show that this is in fact the case. As shown in Ta-
ble HI, imports of all products fell upon the flling of cases and
preliminary determination of dumping. Plate imports fell pre-
cipitously from 13.8 percent of apparent domestic consumption
(ADC) in 1992 to only 2.8 percent in 1993. Likewise, imports of
corrosion resistant products fell from 14.0 percent to 6.2 percent
of ADC. Cold rolled imports fell from 4.9 percent to 4.0 percent
and hot rolled imports dropped from 17.5 to 14.2 percent.
Trade P o l i c y S t r a t e g i e s and Enforcement Choices . . . 9 3
Table HI





















































Source: Dewey-Ballantine, LLP. Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce data
and American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Reports.
What about after the cases have been decided? Most of
the afflrmative determinations by the ITC were in cut-to-length
plate and corrosion resistant products. Imports in both categories
continued to fall. Plate imports slid from 2.8 percent of apparent
domestic consumption in 1993 to 1.8 percent in 1997. Corrosion
resistant imports similarly dropped from 6.2 percent in 1993 to
2.9 percent in 1997. Even cold rolled products, on which there
were fewer duties imposed, continued to fall from 4.0 percent
in 1993 to 1.0 percent in 1997. Hot rolled products, however,
indicate a different pattern. With no antidumping orders from
the ITC, imports of hot rolled products surged from 14.2 percent
in 1992 to 21.3 percent in the year immediately following
the ITC's ruling. Hot rolled imports continued to climb to
23.8 percent of the market in 1997.
Another way to look at the impact of the case determinations
would be to compare imports of similar products from countries
that were covered by orders to those from countries not covered.
This comparison offers two useful points of analysis. First, the
countries not covered by flnal antidumping orders provides a
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sort of control group against which change in imports from the
covered countries can be compared. If imports had fallen in
both groups, for instance, it could be inferred that antidumping
orders were not responsible for the reduction in imports from
the covered countries. This is not the case, however. As shown in
Table IV, imports from countries not covered surged immediately
after the flnal ITC rulings and have continued to grow. Imports
from covered countries, on the other hand, fell during the
investigation stage of the cases, dropped more after the ITC
determinations, and continued to slide in subsequent years.
A second way to look at the data in Table IV is to consider
the trend in total imports from both covered and non-covered
countries. Total imports for all sources of cold rolled and plate
products were fairty steady, increasing slightly each year until the
cases were flled. After 1993, however, import increases from non-
covered countries more than offset the decreases from covered
countries. Non-covered imports of cold rolled steel increased by
Table IV






















































Source: Dewey-Ballantine, LLP. Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce data
and American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Reports.
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9.9 percent of ADC from 1992 to 1997, overwhelming the 3.9
percent decrease in covered products from 1992 to 1997. Covered
imports of plate dropped from 13.8 percent of ADC to 1.8 percent
between 1992 and 1997 but non-covered steel imports increased
during the same period from 4.0 percent to 18.5 percent, an
increase of 14.5 percent compared to a decrease of 13.0 percent.
Total imports surged after the ITC ruled and remained at levels
higher than they were before the cases were brought.
So, as expected, imports did fall as a result of afflrmative
decisions by the ITC. In all categories of products and countries
covered by the flnal ITC orders imports fell and continued at
low levels after the decisions were announced. That these reduced
imports were the result of the antidumping actions, and not from
some other cause, is supported by the comparative data showing
imports of like products from countries not covered increasing
after the flnal ITC orders.
There is also a plausible inference that imports shifted to
products not subject to antidumping duties. This is suggested
by the increase in hot rolled imports after the ITC ruling. After
the 1993 ITC decisions, imports of hot rolled steel surged from
14.2 percent to 21.3 percent of ADC, while imports of cold rolled,
corrosion resistant, and plate continued to fall. This suggests that
covered countries may have shifted their export strategies.
It also appears that the flling of cases with the subsequent
investigation by the Department of Commerce has a chilling
effect on imports. All four categories of steel products show
a marked drop in imports after the cases were flled in 1992.
Those that were subsequently subject to antidumping duty
orders by the ITC remained low while others rose. Thus there
does seem to be a "process flling" effect where imports fall
simply as a result of initiating the process of antidumping
cases. Even though preliminary duties are refundable in the
event of a negative determination by the ITC, exporters and
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importers seem immediately to change their behavior while the
antidumping process is underway.
What was the effect of the cases on the health of the industry?
The American steel industry lost massive amounts of money in
the 1980s and early 1990s. Its largest losses were over $4 billion in
1986 and 1992 and over $2 billion in 1991. An abrupt turnaround
occurred between 1992 and 1993, an upswing of nearly $6
billion. This sudden turnaround in 1992-1993 suggests that flling
trade cases with the resulting "process flling" effect had positive
consequences for industry profltability. An even more direct effect
of trade cases was seen in the changes in stock prices. On the
other hand, when the ITC decisions were announced in 1993,
the industry lost $1 billion in market capitalization or over ten
percent of its total stock value. Investors apparently saw the
mixed ITC decision as a setback for the industry.
What is to be concluded from all of this data. First, the
steel industry intended to be an "outcome flier" and, in fact, it
did prosecute the cases to their conclusion without any attempt
at negotiated settlements. Its biggest gain came, however, as
a "process flier." The greatest reduction in imports, and the
highest industry profltability occurred while the cases were being
investigated and decided, not after the decisions were rendered.
VI. TRADE POLICY ENFORCEMENT CHOICES
Enforcement of the antidumping laws depends on the flnal
determinations by the ITC. As has been seen in the steel cases,
the ITC can render decisions that are at variance with what
the Commerce Department's flndings would suggest they should
be. Unlike the Commerce Department, which is concerned only
with whether and to what extent dumping exists, the ITC must
also flnd injury or the threat of injury. In determining injury,
the ITC is directed by statute to look at the eflects of imports
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Source: Author. Based on data provided by the U.S. International
Trade Commission.
on 14 factors, such as sales, capacity utilization, proflts, employ-
ment, and investment. Anderson studied discretionary models of
ITC decisions and concluded that "statutory direction appears
to be the primary force underlying antidumping decisions made
by the ITC." He found "no evidence that commission decisions
are based on political considerations not set forth in the statue"
(1993, p. 928). Perhaps so, but the votes of the ITC commission-
ers on the steel cases suggests an interesting pattern of discre-
tion and political alignment, as shown in Table V (Brook, 1998,
p. 139).
One needs only to reflect upon the party breakdown in
the votes of the ITC commissioners on the steel petitions to
suggest that economic, political, or philosophical viewpoints can
be exercised within the commission" statutory boundaries. How
else, could two partisan groups of commissioners come to such
distinctly different conclusions about enforcing the same trade
laws based on the same information? What might be the effect
on U.S. trade policy enforcement of a change in just one member
of the commission?
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VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of the steel industry's massive antidumping
flling of 1992 has helped to address questions about why petition-
ers bring antidumping cases, how they are processed, and what
their effects on imports can be. The data have shown that an
inhibiting effect on imports can be achieved by the mere flling of
credible cases. The data also show that afflrmative antidumping
decisions result in reductions in imports. On the other hand, im-
port statistics reveal that surges in imports take place in products
and from countries not covered by antidumping orders. In the ex-
ample of the steel cases, these increases overcame any reductions
in covered products. This suggests a relationship between prof-
itability, trade cases, and import levels.
Policy preferences and statutory enforcement have also been
examined relative to antidumping laws. The decisions by the ITC
suggest the exercise of individual political or policy preferences.
Finally, although the steel industry intended to secure long-
term relief as an "outcome flier," its greatest beneflt came as a
"process flier."
NOTE
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